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ABSTRACT: For many reasons, it is often asserted that various segments of the space community need to adopt
standards or need to create standards where ostensibly none exists. Phrases like “build standard spacecraft busses”,
“create plug-and-play interfaces”, or “adopt commercial standards” have become almost commonplace utterances.
However, such discussions often revolve around inappropriate comparisons with the commercial marketplace or
misunderstandings of the standardization process, rather than solutions to clearly stated problems.
Substantial work has been expended on many standardization efforts that have not achieved their intended goals.
Various parallel backplane computer bus standards can be used to illustrate how standards arise – or don’t. This
paper presents three examples of the standardization process. The Futurebus+ (Profile S) standardization activity is
contrasted with the adoption of VMEbus and cPCI by the space community. The Ada programming language
development, standardization, and subsequent mandate for use are contrasted with the grass-roots evolution of C and
C++. The PC/AT bus and PC/104 buses are discussed in their market contexts and contrasted with the closed
architecture of the Macintosh.
Finally, a framework for cost-effective standards development based on similarities with free-market entrepreneurial
activity is presented.

BACKGROUND
Many discussions about the value of standards to the
space community involve vacuous statements regarding
the need for standard spacecraft busses, plug-and-play
interfaces, or commercial standards. Such statements
often reflect beliefs derived from inappropriate
comparisons with the commercial marketplace rather
than solutions to clearly stated problems.

constrained applications characteristic of nano- and
microsats.
In this climate, where many people
recognize the advantages of standards, it is tempting to
say “we need to create some new standards!” However,
without understanding how good standards come into
being, it is too easy to waste considerable effort on
well-intentioned but ultimately dead-end pursuits.

THE TYPICAL PROCESS
Efforts to use standards in space applications are
nothing new. In the mid-1960’s, anticipating shrinking
NASA budgets, research started on a general-purpose
onboard computer for broad mission applicability to
save recurring development costs. This effort led to the
NASA Standard Spacecraft Computer, NSSC-1. In the
1980’s the MIL-STD-1553B bus, developed for
military aircraft, was adopted for use in space missions
(e.g., by Cassini, in a heavily modified form, and
TAOS).
What is new is that the nano/microsat community is
maturing and moving beyond the types of simple
missions that can be cost-effectively served by unique,
non-standard solutions. Although it is time to start
using standards, there are few available solutions that
are properly matched to the mass- and powerCaldwell

1

Standards have evolved in virtually every technical
endeavor. Standards codify wisdom obtained through
the lessons-learned of trial and error pertaining to welldefined problems. Some standards capture sufficiently
important wisdom that there is no reasonable
alternative; their use has often become mandatory
through legislation. Wire your house according to the
National Electrical Code lest you destroy equipment,
electrocute someone, or burn down the house – and
then face civil or criminal actions.
Most standards evolve.
Usually, the primary
knowledge or technology underlying a standard is
initially practiced by a very small group. Over time, the
practicing group expands and becomes more broadly
known. Sometimes, the technology becomes a de facto
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standard, despite having no formal recognition (e.g.,
Philips Semiconductors’ I2C-bus) and its originators
retain control. More commonly, at some point the
group seeks to formally codify its work, either within a
recognized standards body (e.g., IEEE, AIAA, ANSI,
ISO) or by creating its own trade group (e.g., the PCI
Industrial Computer Manufacturer’s Group, PICMG, or
the VMEbus International Trade Association (VITA)
Standards Organization, VSO).
Technology rarely evolves in isolation. Often, other
groups are co-evolving similar practices. Sometimes,
one group will “see the light” and perceive that
another’s solutions are better. In such a case, the two
groups will naturally merge. But many technical
decisions are, in the end, somewhat arbitrary. With
enough differences, inertia, and market penetration,
there might not be enough similarity to simply merge;
despite having much common ground, too many
incompatibilities exist.
A committee is created.
Committee meetings become a forum for wrangling and
compromise. A standard evolves that balances many
competing objectives: technical, business, marketing,
political, legal. Ultimately, language that is generally
acceptable to all parties is written and a new standard is
adopted (e.g., HDTV). Or not (e.g., Beta and VHS).
The system isn’t perfect but it usually works.
Sometimes a committee is created to invent a standard
where no existing practice precedes it. This is not a
good way to start…

A CASE STUDY: FUTUREBUS+, PROFILE S
In the early 1990’s, the VMEbus standard had
established itself as a viable alternative to the approach
of designing mission-specific parallel computer
backplane bus solutions. JPL had selected it for the
MESUR program (later to be known as Mars
Pathfinder) and Spectrum Astro had used it in the
MSTI-1 mission. Both of these used single-string
primary computers and the flight systems were
considered experimental and moderately high risk.
Forward-looking members of the space computing
community anticipated that the acceptance of a
computer backplane standard within the broader
community would hinge on addressing the high
reliability and high availability needs of space users.
In 1992, as a result of interest in the space community,
the IEEE Computer Society / Microprocessors and
Microcomputers established IEEE standards working
group 896.10 to define the “Standard for Futurebus+®
Spaceborne Systems - Profile S” for the stated purpose
that:
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Current backplane protocol standards do not
address the unique requirements associated with
spaceborne processing systems. This standard will
establish and specify the requirements (bus,
mechanical
and
electrical)
to
support
implementation of spaceborne Futurebus+ based
processing systems.(1)
The working group reflected the diverse needs of the
space community, drawing its membership from the
spacecraft user/builder community (NRL, JPL, TRW,
etc.), from the heavy launch industry (Atlas and Titan),
and from the avionics and component suppliers
(Honeywell, National Semiconductor, etc.).
The Futurebus+ backplane standard (IEEE 896 family)
was selected because of its flexible high performance
architecture, which supported 32-, 64-, 128-, and 256bit wide data paths (in the same era that VMEbus
supported 8-, 16-, and 32-bit data transfers). The
working group defined physical and logical layers to
support
high-reliability
and
high-availability
configurations. High reliability was supported by a
dual-bus configuration to support block-redundant coldsparing at the board level. High availability was
supported by a triple modular redundant configuration
to allow real-time operate-through capability. The
committee defined a secondary serial bus on the
backplane to provide the system manager with a
backdoor for reconfiguring the system, and it worked
with a companion standards group (1101.4) to define a
conduction-cooled form factor.
In 1997, the standard was approved through the IEEE
standards balloting process and officially became
ANSI/IEEE Standard 896.10-1997.
IEEE standards must be reviewed at least every 5 yrs.
This process requires, among other things, finding
enough interested parties to perform the review. On
February 7, 2003, IEEE Std 897.10-1997 was formally
withdrawn. It is no longer an IEEE standard and is no
longer endorsed by the IEEE. The author can find no
evidence that any system was ever built using this
standard.
What went wrong? Clearly, the features accommodated
by the standard (block redundancy and operate-through
voting redundancy) were desirable to the space
community. Why were there no users at all, even
among the organizations that had supported the
standardization effort?
Futurebus+, Profile S, suffered from trying to create a
single solution that would solve all anticipated
problems: throughput, reliability, and availability. Any
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user would have to pay a penalty for features that they
didn’t need. Worse, there was a degenerate case (single
string, moderately high performance computing) that
was adequately served by the existing solution
(VMEbus) but which would pay a particularly high
price for the extra features.
In the mid-90’s, the majority of spacecraft desiring to
use a standard parallel backplane bus used VMEbus in
a single-string centralized processing architecture. The
few users who wanted to use VMEbus but needed
higher reliability solved this problem in the historical
manner, by cross-strapping block-redundant larger
functional assemblies.
This approach provided
sufficiently high reliability (or at least answered
requirements to ensure no single point failures), and the
finer-grained standby redundancy offered by the new
Futurebus+ thus had little perceived value.
As far as operate-through high-availability systems
were concerned, only the Titan launch vehicle family
was entertaining an avionics upgrade. This potential
user was eliminated by the EELV competition of the
late 1990’s
Finally, the engine of technological advance was
addressing the one Futurebus+ feature of broad interest,
data throughput. The same industrial community that
advanced VMEbus also had performance growth issues.
Although VME-64 offered an upgrade path, the PCI
bus was even more attractive. The CompactPCI
standard evolved by marrying an existing highperformance electrical standard to an existing, proven
mechanical form factor. PCI variants now support as
much as 1 GB/s throughput, far higher than envisioned
by Futurebus+. There are even CompactPCI variants
that support the high reliability needs of the telecom
industry.
It should be noted that, despite being more advanced,
cPCI has not displaced VMEbus in space applications.
Many spacecraft use a hybrid system architecture, using
cPCI for high-performance memory and I/O operations,
while using VME for low-speed I/O connectivity. This
largely boils down to simple economics. The highperformance RAD750 processor is only available in
cPCI; if one wants its performance, one must support
cPCI. But most such users have legacy VME I/O
boards that are more than adequate and whose
migration to cPCI is not economically justified. Since
both buses have common board form factors, two
different buses can coexist in the same chassis with
minimal overhead.

Caldwell

3

RULE #1: SOLVE THE RIGHT PROBLEM
Probably the first rule of creating something with an
eye toward its becoming a standard is to solve the right
problem – or at least a right problem. If you have a
technical problem to solve, either
a) yours is a unique problem and it really doesn’t
matter how you solve it (with respect to its
becoming a standard solution) because no one
else will care; or,
b) it is a general problem and one or more others
have already solved it adequately, in which case
you should probably consider adopting the
already-implemented solution; or,
c) it is a general problem (or, better yet, you’re on
the cutting edge and you can see that it will
become a general problem), no one has come up
with an adequate solution, and you can do better.
If the goal is to create a standard, the requirementsdefinition process should mirror that of creating any
product that is to be sold in the free market. Potential
users should be identified who have the substantially
the same problems. The first solution should probably
be good enough to start getting an initial-adopter
community working together (rather than trying to hit a
home run with the “perfect” end solution), a community
that is willing to help work out the kinks (read: beta
testers) before moving to a larger audience or market.
Iteratively evolve. If your solution builds on an
existing standard or technical approach, make sure you
understand everything you’re buying into; often there is
more to a standard than the naïve user is aware.
As a counterexample to this rule, consider the creation
of “plug-and-play” solutions for space systems.
Clearly, significant time and effort go into the space
system integration process. Commercial solutions to
the component integration problem involve the “plugand-play” features of both PCI and USB. It would
seem that a similar approach would benefit the space
community. But there are significant differences.
The integration problem faced by the consumer
electronics industry is how to allow component A
manufactured by random company A1 to be plugged
into component B sold by random company B1 – in the
presence of unrelated random components C, D and E,
not to mention random software programs F, G, and H
(and six variants of operating system M). And the
integrator (consumer) is generally not tech-savvy. A
call center that can handle all possible variations and
help the myriad frustrated customers is costly. System
components that carry integration information with
them and automatically communicate during the
integration process is a reasonable way to communicate
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between manufacturers – effectively cutting the
nominal integrator (the consumer) out of the process.
The enormous front-end software cost associated with
the USB device drivers supporting this seemingly
simple process (for devices of any complexity) are
worth the investment for companies whose alternative
is to actively support thousands (or tens of thousands)
of customers after the product is in the field.
The aerospace system integration problem is very
different. Component A is produced by a specific
company. Component B is produced by another very
specific company or perhaps the integrator. The
integrator has the ability to take pains to know what the
relationship is between A, B, and all the other system
components. The integrator is almost assuredly techsavvy and probably highly educated. If configuration
information is needed during integration, the cost to
transfer this information using ancillary media is not
great.
When problems are encountered during
integration, there are reams of technical documentation
and, usually, an army of technical personnel who can be
consulted. The aerospace integration problem is in the
lack of maturity of the interfaces when the two sides
meet – and this problem cannot be solved by “plug-andplay” architectures. In fact, the extra work expended in
trying to support “plug-and-play” in its commercial
sense will exacerbate the problem by taking resources
away from ensuring the interface’s maturity.

In 1983, the US Department of Defense (DoD)
mandated that all mission-critical applications with
more than 30% new code in the result be written in
Ada. Waivers were often granted. Early compilers
were very slow.
The run-time overhead added
significant burden in the embedded, real-time
applications that Ada targeted. Few programmers had
experience with Ada; large projects paid a substantial
premium for this skill. In 1997, as DoD started
embracing COTS standards, it effectively eliminated
the Ada mandate.
Various studies indicate that total life-cycle costs for
software projects implemented in Ada are substantially
lower than those implemented in C/C++ (or any other
language), that defect rates are substantially lower, and
that overall product reliability is substantially higher.
Yet today, for embedded real-time software
development projects (the primary target for the Ada
effort), there is about ten times the demand for C/C++
personnel as there is for Ada. Among many software
developers and managers, there remains the perception
that Ada isn’t the right tool for the very applications for
which it was developed.

RULE #2a: DON’T EXPECT TO LEGISLATE
BEHAVIOR

CASE #2: ADA vs C
Faced with an explosive growth of software costs in
military procurements, the US Department of Defense
(DoD) initiated the Higher Order Language Working
Group (HOLWG) in 1975. Among other things, over
400 programming languages and dialects were believed
to be in use in DoD projects at that time. This group
worked throughout 1975 to establish requirements for a
new programming language that would address
software engineering of large, complex projects with
attention to language standardization, validation,
reliability, maintainability. In 1976, the HOLWG
evaluated 23 languages against the requirements. The
C language, first documented in 1974, was not among
the 23. In early 1977, the HOLWG concluded that no
existing language was suitable and that a new language
needed to be developed.
Based on a revised set of requirements, an RFP was
released in April 1977. Seventeen proposals were
received. Four contractors were picked to build
prototypes. A single winner was selected in May 1979
and the language was officially named “Ada.” After
ANSI review and subsequent revisions, Ada became
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The “Ada mandate” did not result in its acceptance. In
fact, the mandate might have had the perverse effect of
reducing its acceptance, since software engineers (like
most creative people) tend to resent such directives.
The waiver process was porous enough that it was
relatively straightforward for many projects to find the
appropriate rationale for exemption (not unlike
obtaining sole-source procurement authorizations).
Many reasons provided real enough arguments: existing
code base, performance requirements, personnel
availability, project schedule.
In free markets, a large number of individual decisions
collectively select the winners, whether they are
tangible products or intangible things like standards.
The small satellite community is closer to being a freewheeling marketplace than the larger aerospace
industry is. In theory, more ideas can be explored in
less time with small sats than with much larger craft.
With many more technology innovators and systemlevel decision makers, the small sat community should
act like a marketplace of entrepreneurs and arms-length
buyers, allowing grass-roots bottoms-up technology to
19th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

drive standards evolution rather than relying on a topdown requirements-driven procurement process.

RULE #2b: EXPECT TECHNICAL PROGRESS
Technology happens. Ada took eight years to develop.
During this time, C was used to implement UNIX.
With its roots in research and academia, C spread
through the higher education world. By the time Ada
was formally standardized, C was a de facto standard
that had been learned by eight or ten classes of
computer science students. By the time of the Ada
mandate, C was in widespread use and C++ had been
created. Despite the DoD’s goal of reducing the
amount of training needed by each program, the reality
(or at least the perceived reality) was that projects using
Ada faced a not-insignificant up-front cost of workforce
training that C-based projects avoided. Without a longterm vision (or with a self-contained project budget that
didn’t account for long-term benefits), it was difficult to
justify this investment.
Whether you’re building the perfect widget or the
perfect standard, other things are happening in the
world while you’re developing. Keep the development
cycle short and get the word out that you have the best
technology. Build a user community and get feedback
early. You cannot be successful in a vacuum.

CPU modules were created to replace the larger
motherboards, allowing whole computers to be built in
the now-familiar 3.8” x 3.6” footprint.
Many
manufacturers sell a wide variety of module types and it
is easy to create new functions and products.
In contrast to IBM, Apple retained intellectual property
control over its Macintosh architecture. Third-party
vendors were carefully vetted and few were allowed to
develop plug-in hardware.
While the Mac’s
architecture is generally considered cleaner than the
PC’s and this has led to fewer system integrity
problems, the closed system approach has hindered its
adoption by many market segments, such as
instrumentation, automation, and embedded systems.
Today’s PC contains several communications
standards, each serving different purposes. The PC AT
and EISA buses have been supplanted by PCI (due
more to plug-and-play configuration considerations
than performance). Specialized buses serve video
displays (the Advanced Graphics Port) and hard drives
(the IDE/ATA and, now, Serial ATA). Within the
space community, the need for a general-purpose
parallel bus has been answered by both VMEbus and
cPCI. Is there no special problem within our industry
that justifies a simplified interface standard like SATA?

RULE #3: YOU CAN’T PLAN EVERYTHING
CASE #3: IBM PC/AT, PC/104, APPLE
When IBM engineers created their PC (and, later, the
PC/AT), they needed a low cost parallel bus for I/O on
their new motherboard. They didn’t set out to create an
interface standard. They simply needed a solution and
built something that was good enough to get the
product to market. They didn’t even document the
internal details of the bus for external use (e.g., bus
signal timing).
Despite this, third-party vendors
introduced a plethora of add-on products for the PC.
Later, entrepreneurs built alternate motherboards to
host the interface, based on the existence of a market of
such plug-in I/O boards. For years, the only way of
determining compliance with this de facto standard was
to plug a board into a real IBM PC and see if it worked.
An entire industry grew up around this unplanned
standard.
Like the PC/AT bus, the PC/104 standard arose
serendipitously. PC/104 originated as “Mini Modules,”
created at Ampro to provide modular expansion I/O
capability for PC motherboards used in embedded
systems, where the card-edge finger connector of the
original PC bus was not mechanically sound. Later,
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As the previous examples show, not every carefully
planned standards activity results in an accepted, widely
used standard. And not every accepted, widely used
standard results from formal standards activity. In fact,
it is probably the case that more standards in use today
originated from individual or small-group activities that
later got formally blessed as standards than originated
as committee efforts. Technology happens.

A STANDARDIZATION CHECKLIST
Thirty and forty years ago, NASA and DoD dominated
technical direction in the (U.S.) space community.
Today, there are many more players who at least have
the potential to direct the technical evolution of space
components and systems. In this free-market, survivalof-the-fittest environment, technologists can increase
their likelihood of creating respected and accepted
solutions that ultimately become standards by thinking
like entrepreneurs who are developing products.
The following questions are similar to those that one
should pose when trying to create a marketable product.
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This list is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather it is
intended to serve to start the process.

End Game
How will I know that I’m done? What are my success
criteria?

Problem Statement
What problem am I solving? What confidence do I
have that I understand how others have or might have
addressed this problem?
Problem Type
Is this a technical problem, a process problem, or a
personnel problem? Can it be solved with a widget or
might it be better solved with a standard procedure?
Can the solution be packaged in a way that is easily
conveyed to its intended audience? Can it be “sold”?
Market / User Community
Who cares? Whose problem is this? Does anyone else
actually have the same problem? Can it be stated in
general terms that describe a target market or
community? Are my assumptions about the intended
audience correct? Have I really researched the target
market or community?
Market / User Value
What is the likely perceived value of the solution in its
intended market? Is that target market likely to accept
the costs associated with my solution, whether direct
financial costs or indirect costs (e.g., mass, power,
complexity, etc.)?

CONCLUSIONS
The small satellite community has reached the stage
where many individuals and companies recognize the
potential value of using standards to reduce their
spacecraft development efforts, costs, and schedules.
This community has unique problems that are not
adequately addressed by existing commercial or
aerospace standards, leading to the conclusion that new
standards are needed. But naïve approaches that simply
set out to establish such standards risk being overtaken
by other solutions. Standards evolve and become
accepted in many different ways. Some approaches are
more likely to be successful than others.
Given the nature of the small spacecraft community as
a dynamic collection of many disparate thinkers, we
might be best served by a market-driven approach to
standards development and adoption, rather than the
requirements-based approach that has often driven
military and aerospace technology efforts in the past.
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Host Organization Value
What will my organization get out of this? Will we
give it away to enhance other aspects of our business?
Will we try to protect it and license it, risking that
others might object to such apparently self-serving
behavior and then develop their own solutions?
Implementation Approach
How will I get a prototype built? Who will be my betatesters? Do I expect to have the resources in my own
organization to do this internally, or might it be better
to immediately seek outside partners? Would potential
customers be the best partners, or potential
competitors? (Note that establishing a standard with a
potential competitor validates the existence of a market,
creates a unified front, and might make raising capital
easier.) How quickly can I get the ideas developed?
Will the need still exist when I’m done?
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